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Abstract We study the endogenous formation of cartels from a dynamic point of
view. First, we review some stability analyses from existing literature, which usually
predict a rather small cartel as the outcome. We then study a dynamic model, in which
firms can freely leave the cartel if they wish, and firms can enter the cartel if both the
cartel and the firm so desire. We show that the dynamic process converges to a strongly
stable cartel if one exists. Otherwise, the process does not converge, but during the
process the cartel-size will never go below any size predicted by a stability analysis.
Keywords Group decisions · Firm organization · Market structure · Static versus
dynamic
JEL Classification L22 · C72
1 Introduction
It is generally assumed that the formation of a cartel induces positive externalities
on firms outside the cartel and that there is an incentive to free-ride, so that collusive
agreements tend to be unstable.1 Most of the literature on this topic searches for cartels
1 The fact that the existence of a cartel may be hindered by free-riding was observed by Stigler as early
as 1950.
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that are nevertheless stable in some sense, so the models proposed do not answer the
question of what happens in the many cases where no stable agreement exists. The
main contribution of this paper is to develop a model of endogenous formation of
cartels that allows us to deal with such cases.
Selten (1973) was the first to apply a formal non-cooperative model of coalition
formation to the study of cartels. His results suggest that cartels of at most five firms
will be observed. Other early works on cartel formation are comparative static analyses,
i.e., they compare the Nash equilibria of industry structures before and after a merger
(see Salant et al. 1983 for a model à la Cournot and Deneckere and Davidson 1985
for a model à la Bertrand). These studies show that a merger may lead to losses for its
members. This is a somewhat counter intuitive result, as the members of a merger have
the option of leaving their production strategy unchanged after they merge, thereby
obtaining the same profit. One is inclined to believe that profits at the new equilibrium
should be higher, but that intuition is false in general. The concept of a stable cartel
introduced by D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) was the first to take into account the effects
on profits at the new equilibrium after addition or loss of a cartel member. A cartel
is called stable if no firm in it has an incentive to defect (internal stability) and no
firm outside it has an incentive to join (external stability). Under the assumptions
of identical firms and equal division of profits in the cartel, a stable cartel always
exists, although it may be degenerate (i.e. consist of a single firm). When they applied
this stability concept to specific economic models, D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) found
that stable cartels are usually relatively small compared to the size of the industry.
Moreover, the fraction of firms in the cartel tends to zero as the size of the industry
increases.
In the definition of stability due to D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) only deviations by a
single firm are considered. In order to allow the possibility of coalitional deviations,
Thoron (1998) develops a non-cooperative model of cartel formation in which all firms
have the option of cooperating (in a cartel) or not. It turns out that the set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes of the Thoron’s cartel formation model coincides with the set
of stable cartels. Thoron (1998) also applies the concepts of a strong Nash equilibrium
and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, and defines strong stability and coalition-proof
stability accordingly. She shows that strongly stable cartels do not necessarily exist,
and that there exists a unique size of coalition-proof stable cartels, which is the size
of a largest stable cartel.
In our view, the inexistence of strongly stable cartels is consistent with what hap-
pens in real life, i.e. cartels break up and other configurations appear, but the stability
concepts mentioned above do not explain how the movements take place. In order
to explain those endogenous changes we introduce a dynamic model of cartel for-
mation. In this dynamic context, convergence to a certain cartel is not guaranteed, as
the cartel may keep changing indefinitely. Shenoy (1979), who was the first to use
this approach for the analysis of coalition formation, introduced the concept of an
elementary dynamic solution. This solution concept captures the dynamic aspect of
negotiations: whenever the negotiation process leads to an alternative that belongs to
an elementary dynamic solution, it may shift to any other alternative that belongs to
the same set in a finite number of steps, and from then on any alternative that does
not belong to this elementary dynamic solution is impossible to reach. The dynamic
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approach thus allows us to understand those situations in which there is no strong Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, since the elementary dynamic solution and the strong Nash
equilibrium coincide when the latter exists, the solution concept we use is consistent
with the more traditional approach. Specifically, we show that convergence to a stron-
gly stable cartel (Thoron 1998) is guaranteed if such a cartel exists. Otherwise the
dynamic process does not converge, but we show that there is a unique set of cartels
to which that dynamic process becomes restricted. From the characterization of this
set, it follows immediately that all cartels in it have at least the size of a largest stable
cartel. The results are derived under the assumptions that a cartel generates positive
externalities for independent firms and that there is an incentive for free riding, which
are assumptions satisfied by most oligopoly models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the results on stability
of cartels by d’Aspremont and Thoron that are relevant to this paper. In Sect. 3, we
introduce our dynamic model of cartel formation. We propose, discuss and analyze a
mechanism that governs the possible moves from one cartel to another. We illustrate
the results for a Cournot oligopoly model with a homogeneous product. Finally, Sect. 4
contains some conclusions and pointers for further research.
2 Preliminaries
We consider an oligopoly that consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of firms (with n ∈ N).
We assume that any subset of N can form a cartel, at most one cartel can exist at a
given time, all firms in the oligopoly are ex-ante identical, and firms inside a cartel
share their profits equally.2 As a consequence, the profit of a firm depends only on the
size of the cartel and on whether the firm is independent or a member of the cartel.
Let πC (k) denote the profit of a firm that belongs to a cartel of size k, and let π I (k)
denote the profit of an independent firm in the presence of a cartel of size k.
D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) calls a cartel of size k internally stable
if k = 1 or if k > 1 and πC (k) ≥ π I (k − 1),
and externally stable
if k = n or if k < n and π I (k) ≥ πC (k + 1).
A cartel is stable if it is both internally stable and externally stable.
D’Aspremont et al. show that a stable cartel always exists, although it may be
degenerate (that is, it may have only one member). In the following theorem, we
provide a proof of d’Aspremont’s existence result, and an explicit expression for the
size of a largest stable cartel.
2 This assumption is fulfilled if firms inside a cartel bargain “a la Nash.” Since firms are symmetric, the
distribution of gains will be symmetric.
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Theorem 1 A stable cartel always exists and the size k∗ of a largest stable cartel is
k∗ := max{k | πC (k) ≥ π I (k − 1); k > 1},
if we adopt the convention that the maximum over the empty set is 1.
Proof To see that a cartel of size k∗ is stable, observe that the internal stability condition
is trivially satisfied if k∗ = 1, and if k∗ > 1, it follows from πC (k∗) ≥ π I (k∗ − 1),
by definition of k∗. External stability is trivially satisfied if k∗ = n, and if k∗ < n, it
follows from πC (k∗ + 1) < π I (k∗), by definition of k∗. To see that k∗ is the size of a
largest stable cartel, note that πC (k) < π I (k − 1) for all k > k∗ by definition of k∗.
Hence the internal stability condition πC (k) ≥ π I (k − 1) is violated for all k > k∗.
unionsq
In the same framework, Thoron (1998) defines a non-cooperative game G in which
the firms are the players and each player has the choice between two actions, C and I .
If a firm chooses C , it will be member of the cartel. If it plays I , then it will be
independent.
Thoron shows a one-to-one correspondence between stable cartels defined by
D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) and the Nash equilibria of G.
Theorem 2 (Thoron 1998) A cartel of size k is stable if and only if it is the outcome
of a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative game G.
The definition of stability considers a possible deviation by individual firms. A firm
can either leave the cartel or join it. Thoron calls a cartel strongly stable if it is the
outcome of a strong Nash equilibrium in G, i.e. if no coalition of firms has an incentive
to deviate from their strategies.
Thoron makes two assumptions on the profit functions π I and πC .
A1 π I (k) > π I (k − 1) for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}.
A2 π I (1) = πC (1) and π I (k) > πC (k) for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}.
Assumption A1 says that the profit of an independent firm increases as the cartel
size increases. Hence, collusion generates a positive externality on independent firms.
Assumption A2 says that, given a cartel, an independent firm receives a larger profit
than a firm in the cartel. Therefore, firms that remain independent are free-riders.
Theorem 3 (Thoron 1998) Under Assumption A2, a cartel of size k is strongly stable
if and only if
(i) πC (k) ≥ π I (k − l) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and
(ii) π I (k) > πC (k + l) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , n − k}.
That is, a cartel is the result of a strong Nash equilibrium if it is strongly internally
stable, and strongly externally stable. A strongly stable cartel satisfies a property of
strong internal stability: no coalition of firms in the cartel has the incentive to jointly
defect from it, and a property of strong external stability: no coalition of firms outside
the cartel has the incentive to join it. However, it is not difficult to find examples for
which no strongly stable cartel exists (Sect. 3).
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The fact that strong Nash equilibria may fail to exist motivated (Bernheim et al.
1987; Bernheim and Whinston 1987) to introduce the concept of a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium. This concept also allows for coalitional deviations, but not all profitable
coalitional deviations are considered as valid deviations here. Thoron calls a cartel
coalition-proof stable if it is the outcome of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in G.
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions A1 and A2, there is a unique size for coalition-proof
stable cartels, which is k∗, the size of a largest stable cartel.
3 Dynamic cartel formation
In this section, we introduce a dynamic model of cartel formation: we consider the
possibility of a transition from one cartel to another and that an infinite sequence of
such transitions may take place. Let us call a directed graph G a transition graph if its
vertex set is the set of cartels. Its arc set is the set of possible transitions.
The term abstract game is sometimes used to denote a pair (X, dom), where X is a
set of outcomes and dom is a binary relation defined on X . Thus, any transition graph
may also be interpreted as an abstract game. As a solution concept for abstract games,
Shenoy introduces the concept of an elementary dynamic solution.3 Here, we give the
definition in terms of a transition graph.
Definition 1 A nonempty set A of cartels is an elementary dynamic solution (EDS)
of a transition graph G if
(i) for every K ∈ A and every L ∈ A, there is a directed path in G from K to L ,
and
(ii) there is no K ∈ A and L /∈ A such that there is a directed path in G from K to
L .
The first condition says that for any two cartels there is a sequence of possible
transitions from one to the other. This implies that whenever the transition process
leads to a cartel in an EDS the process may subsequently lead to any other cartel in the
same EDS. The second condition says that no cartel outside an EDS can be reached
from a cartel inside the EDS. Thus, once the process leads to a cartel in an EDS,
the process is restricted to that set, and there is no smaller set of cartels to which the
process will become restricted. There is at least one EDS in our finite context (see
Shenoy, Theorem 2). In general there may be more than one EDS, in which case these
sets are obviously disjoint. In what follows we explore several restrictive assumptions
on a transition graph and then investigate the EDSs under Assumptions A1 and A2.
We assume that firms inside a cartel are free to leave, but cannot be forced to leave.
We also assume that firms outside the cartel need the consent of firms inside the cartel
to enter, but cannot be forced to enter.
Let K ⊆ N be a cartel. We say that a group of firms M ⊆ N can move from K to
another cartel L , and we write K M→ L , if one of the following two conditions holds:
3 The union of all elementary dynamic solutions is called dynamic solution. This solution was previously
defined by Kalai et al. (1976) under the name of admissible set. Schwartz (1974) also introduces an equivalent
solution, called top cycle solution.
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(i) L ⊆ K and K\L ⊆ M ,
(ii) K ∪ L ⊆ M .
Condition (i) means that a group of firms leaves the cartel K . The firms of L that
remain in K do not have to agree with this transition: if all members of K\L want
to leave, they can do so. Now, any group of firms M such that M ⊇ K\L would be
able to force the transition from K to L . Condition (ii) means that the new cartel L
contains at least one firm outside K . In this case, all members of K have to agree with
the transition. All new members of the cartel also have to agree, so in fact the consent
of everyone in K ∪ L is needed. Therefore, any group of firms M ⊇ K ∪ L would be
able to force the transition from K to L .
We say that the move K M→ L is profitable if no firm in M loses and at least one
firm in M strictly gains. We define GP as the transition graph whose arc set consists
of the cartel pairs (K , L) for which a profitable move of the type K M→ L exists.
Not all transitions in GP seem equally reasonable. Suppose that a group M of firms
is considering the move K M→ L . Then each member of M is likely to take other
possible moves into consideration before making its decision, and it may have better
options. Say that the move K M
′→ L ′ is a countermove for K M→ L if the following two
conditions hold:
(i) The move K M
′→ L ′ is profitable;
(ii) For all i ∈ M ′, i’s payoff at L ′ is no less than the maximum of its two payoffs at
K and L , and for at least one ıˆ ∈ M ′ ∩ M , ıˆ’s payoff at L ′ is strictly higher than
the maximum of its two payoffs at K and L .
We call a profitable move robust if it has no countermove, and we denote by GR the
transition graph that represents the set of robust moves. If a group of firms plan a move
that is robust, then it seems likely that the plan will indeed be carried out, since it is
profitable for everyone who has a say in it, and no one has a better alternative.
If firms indeed look around for other possibilities when a plan comes up, then it
seems unlikely that a plan will be carried out if it has a robust countermove, since this
is a better and credible alternative for at least one of the firms. The situation is less clear
when a profitable move has only non-robust countermoves, since such countermoves
may not be credible alternatives. Let GNRC denote the transition graph of profitable
moves without a robust countermove (NRC move). Note that GR ⊆ GNRC, where the
notation G ⊆ H means that the arc set of G is a subset of the arc set of H.
Now, let G∗ denote the actual transition graph. We have argued that every transition
in GR corresponds to a plan that is likely to be carried out. Therefore, we will assume
that GR ⊆ G∗. Also, every transition not in GNRC corresponds to a plan that is unlikely
to be carried out. Therefore, we assume G∗ ⊆ GNRC. In the following, we demonstrate
that, under Assumptions A1 and A2, the EDSs of GR and GNRC coincide, so that we
are able to characterize the EDSs of G∗.
Define kˆ as the cartel size for which the payoff to firms inside the cartel is maximal.
If there are different cartel sizes for which this payoff is maximal, then choose the
smallest. Formally,
kˆ := min{k | πC (k) ≥ πC (l) for all l ∈ N }.
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Further, define k as the minimum number of firms needed for a cartel such that an
independent firm receives a profit that is higher than the profit of firms inside a cartel
of size kˆ. Formally,
k := min{k | π I (k) > πC (kˆ)}.
If kˆ ≥ 2, then k ≤ kˆ, since then π I (kˆ) > πC (kˆ) by Assumption A2. As there is no
incentive to form a cartel if kˆ = 1, we assume that kˆ ≥ 2. Recall from Sect. 2 that the
unique size of a largest stable cartel is
k∗ := max{k | πC (k) ≥ π I (k − 1)}.
We have π I (k−1) ≥ π I (k) > πC (kˆ) ≥ πC (k) for all k > k, where the first inequality
follows from A1, the second from the definition of k, and the third from the definition
of kˆ. Hence, it follows from the definition of k∗ that k∗ ≤ k. In summary, for the three
special cartel sizes k∗, k and kˆ, we have
k∗ ≤ k ≤ kˆ.
Lemma 1 Let K be a cartel of size k > k. Then for all i ∈ K , the move K {i}→ K\{i}
is robust. Also, for any other profitable move at K , there is a robust countermove of
the type K {i}→ K\{i}.
Proof 4 Consider a profitable move of the type K M→ L . Since k > k, we have
π I (k) > π I (k) > πC (kˆ) ≥ πC (l), where the first inequality follows from A1, the
second from the definition of k, and the third from the definition of kˆ . This shows that
no independent firm has entered the cartel with this move, as the move was assumed
to be profitable, so we have proved that L ⊂ K .
Choose i ∈ K\L . We will now show that the move K {i}→ K\{i} is robust and
that, unless L = K\{i}, it is a countermove for K M→ L . Observe that the move
K
{i}→ K\{i} is indeed profitable, since k > k ≥ k∗, hence π I (k − 1) > πC (k) by
definition of k∗. To see that it is a countermove for K M→ L if L = K\{i}, note that
π I (l) < π I (k −1) by A1, since l < k −1 in this case. Hence, is payoff will be strictly
higher if it moves to K\{i}. Finally, to see that K {i}→ K\{i} is robust, it suffices to
observe that this move is actually a countermove for all other profitable moves that
involve firm i . Therefore, no other move can be a countermove for it. unionsq
Lemma 2 Let K be a cartel of size k < k, and let Kˆ be a cartel of size kˆ. Then the
move K M→ Kˆ is robust for all M with M ⊇ K ∪ Kˆ .
Proof We have π I (k) ≤ πC (kˆ), by definition of k and the fact that k < k. This shows
that independent firms that join the cartel Kˆ , i.e. the members of Kˆ\K do not lose.
We also have πC (k) < πC (kˆ), by definition of kˆ and the fact that k < k ≤ kˆ. This
4 We use upper-case letters to indicate cartels. For the size of a cartel, we use the corresponding lower-case
letter.
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shows that members of K ∩ Kˆ strictly gain. Also members of K\Kˆ strictly gain, since
πC (k) < πC (kˆ) < π I (kˆ), where the second inequality follows from A2. Finally,
possible members of M\(K ∪ Kˆ ) strictly gain, since π I (k) ≤ πC (kˆ) < π I (kˆ). We
have proved that the move K M→ Kˆ is profitable, since no one in M loses and the
members of K (a non-empty set) strictly gain.
To see that the move is robust, suppose that the move K M
′→ L is a countermove for
it. If l ≥ kˆ and L = Kˆ , then at least one cartel member of L is independent in Kˆ . Its
payoff at L , however, is strictly less than it is at Kˆ , since πC (l) ≤ πC (kˆ) < π I (kˆ),
where the first inequality is by definition of kˆ, and the second by A2 . Therefore, l < kˆ.
However, for all l < kˆ, we have πC (l) < πC (kˆ) = min(πC (kˆ), π I (kˆ)), where the
inequality is by definition of kˆ and l < kˆ, and the equality is by A2. This means that
the payoff of all members of L is strictly less than it is at Kˆ . So in fact no countermove
exists. unionsq
Lemma 3 Let K be a cartel of size k < k, and let L be a cartel of size l with l ≤ k
or l > kˆ. Then, if the move K M→ L is profitable, it has a robust countermove.
Proof Suppose the move K M→ L is profitable. This implies l = k. If l < k,
then all firms of N receive a profit that is at most max(πC (l), π I (l)) = π I (l),
where the equality is from A2. At a cartel of size kˆ, any firm of N receives at least
min(πC (kˆ), π I (kˆ)) = πC (kˆ), where the equality is again from A2. Since l < k < k,
we have π I (l) < π I (k) ≤ πC (kˆ), where the first inequality is from A1 and the second
one is by definition of k. It follows that K N→ Kˆ is a countermove for K M→ L , where
Kˆ is any cartel of size kˆ . From Lemma 2, this countermove is robust.
If l > kˆ, then consider the move K L→ Kˆ , where Kˆ is chosen to be a subset of
L of cardinality kˆ. This move is robust from Lemma 2. We have πC (l) ≤ πC (kˆ)
by definition of kˆ, so that the members of Kˆ do not lose compared to the move
K M→ L . The members of L\Kˆ (a non-empty set) strictly gain, since l > kˆ ≥ k, hence
π I (kˆ) > πC (kˆ) ≥ πC (l), where the first inequality is by A2 and the second is by
definition of kˆ. This shows that K L→ Kˆ is a robust countermove for K M→ L . unionsq
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that robust moves exist at every cartel, except possibly at
cartels of size k. To handle this case, we need to distinguish between the cases k∗ < k
and k∗ = k.
Lemma 4 If k∗ = k, then no profitable move exists at a cartel of size k. If k∗ < k and
if K is a cartel of size k, then for all i ∈ K , the move K {i}→ K\{i} is robust, and for
any other profitable move at K , there is a robust countermove of the type K {i}→ K\{i}.
Proof For the case k∗ < k, it suffices to read the proof of Lemma 1 once more, and
to observe that the result is valid under the more general condition k ≥ k and k > k∗.
Now assume k∗ = k, let K be a cartel of size k, and consider a move K M→ L . If
l < k = k∗, then max(πC (l), π I (l)) = π I (l) ≤ π I (k∗ − 1) ≤ πC (k∗) = πC (k) =
min(πC (k), π I (k)), where the equalities and inequalities are obtained by applying
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respectively A2, A1 and l ≤ k∗ − 1, the definition of k∗, the assumption k∗ = k, and
A2. Since everyone’s payoff at K is at least the payoff at L , the move is not profitable.
If l ≥ k and L = K , then at least one independent firm at K is a member of L . This
firm is also a member of M and it loses, since π I (k) > πC (kˆ) ≥ πC (l), where the
first inequality is by definition of k, and the second one is by definition of kˆ. Hence,
such a move is not profitable either. unionsq
We now characterize the EDSs of the transition graph G∗.
Proposition 1 If k∗ < k, then the unique EDS of G∗ is A∗ = {K | k − 1 ≤ |K | ≤ kˆ}.
If k∗ = k, then each EDS of G∗ consists of a single cartel, and the size of such a cartel
is k∗ = k.
Proof Assume k∗ < k. It then follows from Lemmas 1, 2 and 4 that for every cartel, a
sequence of robust moves exists, leading to cartels of size k −1, . . . , kˆ, and in fact any
cartel of such size can be reached. Since these are all transitions in GR ⊆ G∗, there is a
unique EDS, which contains A∗. To prove that the unique EDS is equal to this set, we
have to demonstrate that every move in G∗ from a cartel inside A∗ is again to a cartel
inside A∗. It follows from Lemmas 1 and 4 that, for cartels of sizes k, . . . , kˆ, every
move in GNRC is to a cartel with one firm fewer. Since G∗ ⊆ GNRC, this shows that
one cannot leave A∗ from cartels of sizes k, . . . , kˆ. Lemma 3 states that a transition
in GNRC at cartel of size k − 1 is necessarily to a cartel of size k, . . . , kˆ. Hence, one
cannot leave A∗ from a cartel of size k − 1 either.
Now assume k∗ = k. It then follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that for every cartel, a
sequence of robust moves exists, leading to a cartel of size k. According to Lemma 4,
no profitable move exists at cartels of size k. It thus follows that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the cartels of size k and the EDSs of G∗. unionsq
Proposition 1 can be compared with the equilibrium stability results from exis-
ting literature by associating an appropriate transition graph with a given equilibrium
concept. For example, call a move at cartel K strongly Nash if it is a profitable coali-
tional deviation from the strategy profile to form K , and denote the transition graph
of strongly Nash moves by GSN . According to this definition, the strongly Nash equi-
libria (the strongly stable cartels) correspond to singleton EDSs in GSN . In general,
there may be other (non-singleton) EDSs, and that is certainly the case when there is
no strongly stable cartel. Under Assumptions A1 and A2, the transition graph GSN
coincides with the graph GP of profitable moves. The explanation is that under the
assumptions, if it is profitable for a firm to join the cartel then this is also profitable
for the cartel members. Hence, there is no difference between a profitable move under
the open membership rule (i.e. a strongly Nash move) and a profitable move under the
exclusive membership rule, as defined in this paper.
Call a move at K coalition-proof if it corresponds to a coalition-proof deviation
from the strategy to form cartel K , and denote the transition graph of coalition-proof
moves by GC P . By definition, the coalition-proof equilibria correspond to EDSs in
GC P . The graph GC P may have more elementary solutions, but under Assumptions A1
and A2, the EDSs contain cartels of size at most k∗ only. To see this, we need to know
that a coalition-proof deviation is recursively defined as a deviation that is profitable
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and for which no proper subcoalition exists that has a coalition-proof deviation from
the deviation. Now, it is straightforward to prove that the move to a cartel with one
firm fewer (as a result of one firm that leaves the cartel) is a profitable move whenever
the size is larger than k∗. Since there is no proper subcoalition that can further deviate,
it follows trivially that the transition is in GC P . Hence, for a cartel of size k > k∗, a
sequence of coalition-proof moves exists to a cartel of size k∗. Since the last cartel
in the sequence corresponds to an EDS, then all other cartels in the sequence do not
belong to any EDS. So indeed, every cartel in an EDS has at most size k∗.
The question arises of why the dynamic solutions of GC P and G∗ do not intersect,
except possibly at k∗. Part of the answer is given above, and lies in the fact that only
subcoalitions can prevent a profitable deviation in the definition of a coalition-proof
deviation. Hence, a profitable move by one firm is always in GC P , but not necessarily
in G∗, so that a cartel will generally break down further when transitions in GC P are
made, as compared to when transitions in G∗ are made. This explains why the EDSs
of GC P contain small cartels, but it does not explain why all of them are small. We are
able to deduce this from the fact that cartels of size k∗ correspond, by definition, to
EDSs in GC P coalition-proof. To understand why, consider a deviation from a cartel
of size k ≤ k∗ to a cartel of size k′ > k∗, and observe that the subsequent deviation to
a cartel of size k′ − 1 is a coalition-proof deviation from the deviation. Therefore, a
move from k ≤ k∗ to k′ > k∗ is not coalition-proof. We see that the argument why no
cartels larger than k∗ form in GC P is essentially a farsighted argument: no large cartel
is formed, since it will break down later anyway.
The following example illustrates the possible gap between k∗ and k − 1.
Example 1 A Cournot oligopoly model Consider a single industry consisting of n
(n ≥ 3) firms that produce a homogeneous good. The demand function is p = 1 − Q,
with p being the price of the good and Q being the total quantity produced in the
industry. Marginal cost of production is constant and equal to c (0 < c < 1), for all
firms. Given a cartel K ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the cartel and the independent firms compete in
the market by setting quantities simultaneously, i.e. they play a non-cooperative game,
where the action-space of the firms is determined by the quantities that they produce.
It can be shown that a unique Nash equilibrium exists, that the total quantity produ-
ced by the cartel in equilibrium equals the quantity produced by each individual firm,
and that this quantity is q = 1−c
n−k+2 . Hence, the profit π
I (k) of an independent firm
and the profit πC (k) per member of a firm in the cartel are
π I (k) = (1 − c)
2
(n − k + 2)2 and π
C (k) = 1
k
π I (k).
These profit functions indeed show an incentive for free riding, i.e. the model
satisfies A2, which is explained by the fact that the cartel produces as if it were a
single firm, but shares the profit among all cartel members. Also independent firms
receive higher profits when larger cartels form. Hence, the model also satisfies A1.
A simple calculation shows that the profit of a cartel member is maximal if the cartel
consists of all firms. That is, for this example, kˆ = n. Further, it can be checked that
k = 3+n−2√n. Hence, the dynamic analysis suggests that, at a given time, at most
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2√n −2 firms are independent. On the other hand, it can be checked that k∗ = 1 for
all n = 2 and k∗ = 2 if n = 2. Hence, stability analysis predicts the degenerate cartel
of size 1 in all cases except a duopoly, for which it predicts a strongly stable cartel.
4 Concluding remarks
In our model a firm’s profit is characterized by positive externalities of cartel for-
mation (Assumption A1) and there is a free-rider incentive for independent firms
(Assumption A2). These assumptions are fulfilled by many oligopolistic models, e.g.
Cournot, Bertrand and price-leadership models. We restrict our study to the situation
in which all firms are ex-ante identical and at most one cartel can form. The same situa-
tion has also been studied by others, but our approach differs in that we use a dynamic
model to study and predict likely changes in the cartel, as opposed to investigating
stability criteria. The dynamic approach suggests that, at any time, a larger cartel will
be observed than predicted by stability analysis. As in D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) and
Thoron (1998), we assume that firms are myopic when they take a decision, i.e. they
take into account the immediate consequences of their actions, but not the possible
consequences of further actions provoked by the initial action. For a model à la D’
Aspremont et al. (1983) with forward looking players see Diamantoudi (2005).
Assumptions A1 and A2 are descriptive of the economic setting in which the cartel
operates. If these assumptions are not fulfilled, for example if cost-reducing alliances
induce negative externalities on other firms, very different results should be expected.
The assumptions that all firms are ex-ante identical and that at most one cartel can exist
at a given time are restrictions of a different nature. They are introduced to simplify
the analysis, and it is sensible to ask whether similar results would be obtained if
these restrictions were relaxed. In Olaizola (2005), a generalization of the model to
a heterogeneous group of players is analyzed. The results show that there is still a
unique EDS, as long as the players are not “too heterogeneous.” Otherwise, more than
one EDS may exist, even when there are no strongly stable cartels. For a model à
la D’ Aspremont et al. (1983) with heterogeneous firms see Donsimoni (1985) and
Donsimoni et al. (1986).
In the literature on cartel formation it is usually assumed that no more than one cartel
can exist at a given time. An overview of games with externalities across coalitions in
the context of general coalition formation can be found in Yi (1997) (see also Bloch
1996; Ray and Vohra 1997). In an approach similar to Thoron’s, Espinosa and Inarra
(2000) present a non-cooperative view of the case of multiple cartels. The analysis of
a dynamic model that allows several cartels to exist simultaneously is complicated by
the fact that in such a model robust moves do not necessarily exist when profitable
moves exist. Further research is necessary in order to generalize our results, but some
preliminary investigations that deal with this issue can be found in Olaizola (2005).
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